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On the morning of January L9,1994, Thadius Morehead (Morehead)
was driving his vehicle in Butte, Montana with three friends, Joseph Wandler,
Eric Blom, and Robert Chenoweth. The men were driving around Butte with
the stated purpose of picking fights at random. * x x Soon thereafter, the men
came upon appellant's vehicle on Fl¿rrison Avenue. Appellant s/as accompa-
nied by a friend and the two were on their way to go fishing. Morehead
followed closeiy behind appellant and began flashing his lights and honking
his horn in an effort to get appellant's attention and cause him to pull over
his car. Thinking the driver to be an acquaintance, appellant pulled over into
the Âlbertson's parking lot and stopped. Morehead followed and pulled up
alongside appellant. Joseph ìlandler (Wandler) exited Morehead's vehicle and
approached appellant. When appellant rolled down his window, Wandler
punched appellant in the face. lVhen appellant opened his door, he was
dragged out of his vehicle and beaten, punched, and kicked by Wandler and
one or more of the other men. The men continued to punch and kick
appellant while he was lying on the ground.t
INsun¡.NCE CoNsuMER CouNsnrts Cor,uMN
Avororruc rHE INtnNtroNAL Acrs Excr,usroN IN Cesu¡r,ry INSURÂNcE
By PRIF¡,S soR CREG MrrvRo
MTLA member Greg Skakles
found himself in a common
dilemma factng plarntiffs' lawyers;
his client was injured by the inten-
tional act of tortfeasors who were
likely fudgment proof. The only
hope of obtainng adequate compen-
sation for his client, Wdliam Wen-
dell, was through insurance. In the
words of your old science teacher, it
is intuitively obvious to even the
most casual obsele( that the kind
of people who go around "pickrng
f,rghts at random" are probably the
same people who lack the type of
assets it takes to satisfy the injured
victim's personal iniury judgment.
And, there lies the problem: Public
policy forbids the use of insurance
to indemnify willful wrongdoing by
an insured.2
This policy against insuring the
intentional wrongdoer is expressed
in casualty insurance policies such as
Commercial General Liability poli-
cies3 alrd Homeowners policiesa in
which the basic insuring agreements
restrict coverage to arr "occurfence"
which is defined in the policies as ãì
" accident." Automobile policies also
restrict coverage of the insured's lia-
bility to that arising out of ""an acci-
dent."5 Each of these types of poli-
cies contain provisions excluding
from coverage "'bodily injury' or
þroperty darnage' expected or in-
tended by the insured" (or "from the
standpoint of the insured"). The
clear intent of the insurance industry
in drafting the policies is to exclude
coverage for anything that might be
deemed an intentional act.
Issues involving restrictron of
coverage to "accidents" or exclusion
of damage "expected or intended by
the insured" generally reach the
courts in the form of coverage dis-
putes between the insured tortfeasor
and the insurer or between the tort-
feasor's assignee when the tortfeasor
has conveyed his coverage claim and
any attendant bad faith claim to the
plaintiff in settlement. Montana
courts have entertained a range of
such coverage issues over the years.
Acts evincing clear intent to
iniure
For example,'n New l:Iamp-
shÍre fns. Group v. Stecket6 the
insurer denied coverage for defense
or indemnity in a suit for Jake
Strecker's sexual abuse ofhis daugh-
ter. New Hampshire insured under a
farm-ranch Comprehensive General
Liability umbrella policy for Strecker
Fatms, Inc., which also named Jake
Strecker individually as insured.
New Hampshire refused coverage
or defense or the ground that
Strecker's sexual abuse ofhis daugh-
ter was excluded as "personal injury
...arising out of willful violation of a
penal statute or ordinance commit-
ted by or with the knowledge or
consent of the insured." Also the
carcier argued that the coverage was
only for an "occurrence" defined
as "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoinr of the in-
sured." The court upheld the trial
coutt's surrunary judgment ín fa-
vor of New Hampshire. Strecker
had testified in deposition that he
sexually molested his daughter for
ten years, had no mental disabili-
ties, and plead guilty to three
felony charges of sexual molesta-
tion as a result of his conduct. It is
notable that the court said the cover-
age depended on the acts givng rise
to the claims (which acts were inten-
tional) and not on the language of
the complant which thè attorney
ca-n generally dnft to plead a claum
within the coverage.
In Butns v. Undetwtitets
Adjustíng Co.,' Zelet plead guilty
to felony aggøvzted criminal assault
for striking Burns who then sued
him for negligence. The policy lan-
guage excluded expected or in-
tended conduct except that resultrng
from reasonable use of force to
protect people or property. Under-
writers and Consolidated Insurance
refused defense or indemnity after
takrng a statement from T.ei\er that
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rndicated his act was intentionat. A not always be dispositìve on the landowner filed a counterclaim
default negìigence verdict was ren- issue of whether the act was inten- agarnst Lindsay Drilling allegurg, on
dered against Zeùer who then as- tional. In Bloxham v. Mountain the one hand, that Lindsay
signed to the plaintiff in settlement West Farm Buteau Mut. fns. "fraudulently and deliberately"
his rights against the insurers. The Co.,o the insurer denied coverage salted drilling core samples with
Montana Supreme Court upheld the when its inebriated insured lost a small quantìties of gold and, on the
lower court's decision that there was golf bet and caused $31,000 d^ug. other, that the company negligently
no duty to defend even though the by driving his pickup truck on the allowed bystanders to tamper with
complaint alleged a claim cleady tennis courts at Meadowlark Coun- the core samples. The court found
within the coverage. The court said, try Club in Great Falls. In the pro- the negligence allegation did not in-
"the proper fo- volve "intended or
cus of inquiry is ù exPected conse-
the acts Sving
rise to coverage,
not the language
of the com-
plaint." Justice
Sheehy dis-
sented stating
that the test of whether the insurer
must defend is whether the com-
plaìnt states z clzirn within coverage,
not whether the insurer has evidence
outside the complarnt that causes it
to think it can win.
It is general law that the in-
surer's duty to defend is detetmined
under the "fout corners" rule requir-
ing defense if the complaint states a
claim that would fall under coverage
if true.t Flowever, ¡he Steckerand
Burns cases would indicate that, in
situations involving egregious or vi-
olent felony-type wrongs, the insurer
may indeed avoid defense even if
counsel has plead z claim that is
cognizable under the policy. In
Wendell's case against Morehead,
Wandler, Blom and Chenoweth,
State Farm, which insured assailant
Morehead's car, backed by the hold-
it-t5 ir Stecker and Butns and the
fact that Morehead and his buddies
were charged rvith violatrng several
cnmrnal laws of Montana, refused to
defend or rndemni$ Morehead, its
insured driver, or his passengers.
However, the existence of
criminal charges or guilty pleas may
...the test of whether the insurer must defend is
whether the complaint states a claim within coverage,
not whether the insurer has evidence outside the
complaint that causes it to think it can win.
quences" so that
the claim did in
fact set forth a
covered
t'occuffence" afld
vacated the ttial
court's declaratory
iudgment thathad been granted for
U.S.F.&G.
Alternative pleading of intent and
negligence
Rule 8(e)(2) Mont. Rules.Civ.P.
allows counsel to plead claims in the
alter¡ztive or hypothetically. The
technique of pleading, in separate
counts, that the tortfeasor's conduct
was intentiond, artd, in the altema-
tive, negligent, is a common method
by which plaintiffs counsel deals
with conduct which Lhe insurer may
wish to deem intentional for pur-
poses of avoiding coverage. Plead-
ing intentional torts allows plaintiffs
counsel to confront the defendant
with the risk of punitive damages
but also creates risk to the plaintiff
that he or she will lose the right to
defense and indemnity thereby de-
feating the only viable source of
recovery. Pleading negligence in the
alternative makes it fuÃy certain that
the insuter will have to defend a¡rd
creates risk that it will also have to
indemni$r while also creatìng risk
that the plaintiff will not be able to
maintain the specter of punitive
ceeding for crimina-l mischief, the
insured admitted that the prosecu-
tion had probable cause to charge
him \trith the crime. Nevertheless,
the insured steadfastly denied that
his conduct was intentional insisting
his actions were caused by
Malathion poisoning in weed spray
which he later dropped as unsup-
ported by expert testrmony. Júdge
Cebull denied the insurer's request
that it be granted surrnìarJ judgment
that there was no coverage by reason
of the insured's intentional acts. He
noted that the insured's admission of
probable cause in the proceeding for
criminal mischief did not amouflt to
an admission of intentional conduct
that would as z matter of law void
the insurance.
In situations that do not in-
volve violent felonious conduct, the
court appears to follow the "four
corners" de and, as noted in Lind-
say DdIIing & Contracting v. U. S.
FidelÍty & Guar. Co.,to requires
defense if the claim "sets forth facts
which represent a risk covered by
the terms oF the insurance policy."
In Lindsay DrÍIIíng, the plaintiff
':.
t
:i
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I
P¿.cB 16 TmerTnBNDs - WrNTER2000
damages. In any event, counsel
should be careful in any case iuvolv-
ing egregious conduct, i.e., inten.
tional corporate pollutron or minis-
ter's sexual relation with ¿ parish-
ioner he is counseling, not to plead
nto punitìve damages and out of
insurance.
It should be noted here that
insurance of punitive damages is an
issue collateral to that of insurance
of intentional acts. While courts in
some states hold as a matter oF
public policy that insurance cälnot
cover punitive damages,tt itr 1984,
the Montana Supreme Court held in
First Bank (1,{.4.)-Billings v.
Ttansametica fns, Co.rt' thntpto-
viding insurance covetage for puni-
úve damages is not contrarT to pub-
lic policy and said, "we leave the
decision of whether coverage will be
permitted to the insurance c¿rriers
and their customers." The enact-
ment of MCA 533-15-317 n 1987,
stating that punitive damage cover-
age only exists insofar as it expressly
appears in the insurance policy lan-
guage, implicitly confìrmed the
court's declaration of public policy.
This is important because with the
passing of the insurance "crisis" of
the 1980s, punitrve damage coverage
has agaur appeàred in the softer in-
surarìce market in policies urcluding,
for instance, those auto policies
issued by State Farm.
Where the act is volitional but not
intentional
Some acts are volitional but not
intentional. For example, in Millers
Mut, fns, Co, v. Sft^ine4tu zn
ASARCO employee and safety offi-
cer, Strainer, attempted a pncacal
joke on a fellow employee by remov-
rng a frlter tube on his respirator
with the expectation that the fellow
employee would ilrhale harmless
smoke. In fact, the smoke tumed out
to be dangerously toxic, causing
damage. The court, considering
whether Strainer's act was inten-
tional so as to bar coverage, cited the
earlier case of lt{otthwestetn \Ia-
tional Cas. v. Phalenla
Phalen clearly established that
intentional acts are not excluded
under an insurance policy unless the
intentional act results in injuries
which would be expected or
intended. A person may act inten-
tionally without intending or ex-
pectiTrg the consequences of that
15
zct.
The court found that Strainer's
act was volitional but that the results
were not intended. This meant the
act could be intentional for purposes
of avoiding the workers' compensa-
tion bar for the injured employee,
but not be intentional under the
insurance policy exclusion. On the
other hand, courts frequently
refuse insurance coverage for what
I(eeton16 calls "incredibly foolish
conduct." This doctrine, called the
"Damfl Fool" doctrine, refers to that
body of cases where courts have
refused insurance coverage for acts
"too ill conceived to warcanl
allowing the actor to transfer the
risk of such conduct to an insuret."
Judge Molloy relied on Phalen
znd Millers Mutual in deciding
Safeco fns. Co. of Ametica v.
Tunkle.t' Larson was entering Tun-
kle's house when Tunkle shot him
several times. A criminal jury acquit-
ted Tunkle by reason ofselfdefense.
Safeco, Tunkle's homeowner's in-
surer, refused to defend on the
ground that the shooting was not arl
"accident" so as to be a covered
"occurrence" ãrd thus, it was ex-
cluded as an intentional act. How-
ever, Judge Molloy found self
defense to be volitional and not
intentional and held the policy
exclusion did not apply.
However, if the court can see
from the nature of the act that it
evinces an intent to injure, it will bar
coverage under the intentional acts
exclusion as it did in Ameican
States fns. Co. v. l%ÍIloughby.rs
There, Neilsen's conduct included
hitting, biting and kicking two secu-
rity guards who were attemptrng to
restrain him. The guards later sued
Neilsen fot their iniuries. The court
found no separation between the
volitional act and the intent to cause
the resulting damage.
Vhere the act is intentional, but
the damage was not expected or
intended
Because the policy language
generally excludes "damage ex-
pected or intended by the insured,"
the logical method of securing cov-
erage of an act thzt mzy be deemed
intentional is to prove that the de-
fendant didn't expect or intend the
damage. Success in gaining the cov-
erage probably depends on the na-
ture of the act itself. Mutual Set-
uice Cas. Ins. Co. v. McGehee,'o
stands for the broad proposition
that there is no coverage under stan-
dard policy language for acts in-
tended even if there is no subiective
intent to cause specifìc iniuries.
However, the court in that case also
noted that the insured assailant
"aggressively and intentionally"
struck another in the face. In such
circumstances, the court held that it
was irrelevant that the insured
caused an iniury different in chanc-
ter or magnitude from the harm he
subf ectrvely intended.
Where the type or nature of the
act itself is less egregious, the court
will be more liberal in finding that
the damage was unexpected or unin-
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tì-
tended. For example,in Gdndheim from the standpourt of the insured." insuted and, absent a policy provi-
v. Safeco fns. Co. of Ameicalo The irrþtron district said that the sion denying coverage to the inno-
plaintiffs alleged that the Deerfield emotiorul and menul infury claimed cent insured, may recover. For exam-
Hutterite Colony in Fergus County, by plaintiff was not tlre intended or ple, in the Washingtofl case of Uni-
Montana, had for years disposed of expected consequence of the dis- gard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Argonaut
humarr and alimal sewage in a charç. However, the court held that fns. Co.rzo the court allowed defense
coulee upstream from plaintiffs "'the alleçd intentional conduct of and indemnity to the parents whose
property so that their properly was Daly could be expected to cause the 11-year-old son had damaged a
damaged by sewage pollution. The injury claimed by the employee." The school with fire, but refused cover-
Colony's insurer denied coverage court further stated that "[t]here is no age for the son. The court held that
for defense or indemnity on the injury alleçd which could not be ex- each insured is ffeated as having a
ground that the event u/as not â pected to flow from the termination." separate policy with the insurer. In
covered Montana, how-
"occuffence " ever, the coutt fe-
defined under fused Pztùcia
the policy as a' ..."for purposes of uM coverage' an insured's iniuries 'arise out woodhouse cov-
i*Jid,"n'r,, 
^nlra 
of the use' of an uninsured vehicle if the iniuries originate from,
thar it was ex_ or grow out of, or flow from the use of the uninsured vehicle." ::iT " iJ:::;
cluded as where the home-
"property dam- owner's policy
age which is expected or intended contained z clear exclusion barnng
by the insured." The court disagreed Avoiding the "accident" require- coverage where any insured commit-
on that point findmg that the policy ment ted an intentional actthat resulted in
"was intended by the parties to that In TunHe, Judge Molloy the damage. In lVoodhouse v.
conffact to insute both intentional found the word "accident" to be -Fatmerc Uníon Mut. fns. Co.,zs
and unintentional acts or omissions ambþous. He noted that arrrong \)Toodhouse's coinsured ex-husband
of the Deerfield Colony, excluding the definitions in Webster's Third committed suicide by burning him-
from coverage only bodily injury or New Intemational Dictionary were self to death in the couple's mobile
property damage that was expected "lack of intention or necessity, often home which he had been awarded in
or rntended by the Deerfield opposed to design" antd"^n unfore- their divorce. She sued the insurer
Colony."'1 Quoting frcm Pottal seenunplannedevent."Suchdictio- forcoverageofherpersonalbelong-
Pìpe Line Co. v. Stonewail fns. nary de[rnitions leave room for in- ings which were still in the home.
Co.,tt the court stated "the intent of tended acts with uninter-rded results, The court found the exclusion to be
the policy is to insure the acts or so that, as in Tunkle, the court clear in barring coverage for the
omissions of the insured, including might find them to be a covered intentiona.l acts of "an insured" even
[its] intentionâl acts, excludmg only "occurrence." There are many situa- if that meant the innocent insured
those in which the resulting injury is tions in which the insured's voli- could not recover.
either expected or intended from the tional act may súll be "an unfore-
insured's standpoint." seen unplanned event," i.e., engag- Where the intentional act is an
However, in DaIy Ditches b ing in a fight or committing violence "accident'' from the vantage
rigation Dist. v. National Sutety in self defense. point of the insured
Corp.,'o the insuret refused cover- Returning to the Wendell case
age under a CGL policy when an Where one insured is innocent with which this artrcle started, State
employee sued the irrigatron disttict If a policy covefs co-insureds, Farm insured the vehicle driven by
for wrongful discharge and breach and one of them commits the inten- assailant Morehead and his buddies
of the covenaflt of good faith and tional act which excludes coverage and also insured the vehicle driven
fafu dealíng. The policy defined that would normally provide bene- by the injured Wendell. Wendell
"occurrence" as "aîr acci' fìts to the other, then the other claimed against assailant Morehead,
dent...neither expected nor intended insured is deemed an j'innocent" and State Farm refused coverage on
il
it
I
.i
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the ground that the acts of their insured, Morehead,
were intentional. Wendell then made a claim under his
Uninsured Mototist (JNf) coverage, arrd Stâte Farm
refused that claim on the ground that the policy did
not provide coverage for injuries which were not
caused by an accident arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
Hence, the Mo;rtana Supreme Court ultimately consid-
ered two issues: (1) !7as the iniury caused by 
-
"accident"? and (2) did it arise out of the use of an
uninsured motor vehicle?
The court found "accident" to be ambþous,
because it was unclear from whose vãttage point it
was defined. The court held that, for purposes of UM
coverage, whether an "accídent" has occurred must be
viewed from the standpoint of the insured, so that the
intentjonal act of anothet rnay be an "accident" for the
insured. The coutt further held that, "for purposes of
UM coverage, an insured's ir-riuries 'arise out of the
use' of an uninsured vehicle if the iniuries originate
from, or grow out of, or flow from the use of the
uninsured vehicle." Consequently, Wendell had been
rnfured ln an "zccident" arisitrg out of the use of a¡r
uninsured motor vehicle.
Greg Skakles secured compensation for his client
and a good piece of law for plaintiffs' lawyers.
lYendell is important to plaintiffs' lawyers who will
face the frustration of attempting to frnd a source of
compensation for victims of intentional conduct in-
volving automobiles. Consider, for example, the impli-
cations of this case for insurability of injuries arising
from sexual assaults in vehicles, road tage, and tob-
beries involving motor vehicles.
Conclusion
Securing adequate compensation for victims of
intentìonal torts is often hopeless. Commonly, the only
asset available to the plaintiff itr settlement or satisfac-
tion of a verdict is an assþment of whatever rights
the tortfeasor has for defense and indemnity under a
casualry insurance policy. In a case whete the tortfea-
sor's conduct may be deemed by the insurer to be
intentional, it is important to know how to plead and
develop the facts so that the claim comes within the
coverage fot an "occurrence" which is defined as "at1
accident" and to avoid the intentional acts exclusion of
the policy. I
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